Economics of Multi-Level Government

This project develops an economic framework for assessing the effectiveness of multi-level government ? an important conceptual omission in the ESRC's recent devolution programme ? and uses this framework to investigate both theoretical and current governance issues.

The project reviews and develops:

• emerging political economy models of incentives, targets, co-operative/competitive game theory, organisational design and transaction costs (economics of governance approaches)
• success criteria for governance systems, including innovative capacity, effectiveness, effects on broader competition and cohesion and perceived legitimacy
• the efficiency of alternative governance systems and ways in which multiple governance levels may reduce cross-area cohesion
• the means of improving performance in policy in different regions (assessing delivery, performance) and central controls and constraints on local actions (targets, monitoring, incentivising outcomes)
• forms of inter-territorial competition, how they operate at different levels and their consequences (an assessment will be made of the feasibility of developing a major research project on this issue).

The second-stage uses this framework to assess whether regional devolution 'works', at least in relation to efficiency, innovation, and accountability.  This will involve addressing the difficulties of assessing project and policy outcomes when they are a product of multi-level actions, with different levels having different objectives.

At more local levels it will apply similar conceptual thinking to the framework for evaluation of neighbourhood and community initiatives (and for instance community ownership of land, housing and other social economy assets) and whether present approaches are adequate to multi-sector/level actions.  It will also look at applied examples of multi-level governance and policy harmonisation in light of this framework.

Outputs:

Ashcroft, B.K., A.C. Christie and J.K. Swales (2006) ?Flaws and Myths in the Case for Scottish Fiscal Autonomy? Quarterly Economic Commentary 31/1, June 2006.

Swales, K. & Learmonth, D. (2005) The Impact of Spatial Spillovers in a Decentralised Target-Driven Policy Regime, CPPR Discussion Paper 5.

Christie, A.C. & Swales, J.K. (2005) The Barnett Allocation Mechanism: Formula plus Influence?, CPPR Discussion Paper 10.

Christie, A.C. & Swales, J.K. (2006) The Efficiency of Decentralised and Devolved Government: A Framework, CPPR Discussion Paper 11.

Project Team:

Project Co-ordinator: Professor Kim Swales

Project Team: Professor Alan McGregor